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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 000938

SIPDIS

FOR THE DEPARTMENT (ISN/MNSA), GENEVA (CD), UNVIE (IAEA),
USUN (POL), USNATO (POL), AND USEU (POL)

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IAEA, NPT, PL

SUBJECT: POLAND SUPPORTS U.S. ON NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 83600

1B. WARSAW 227

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAN SAINZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
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11. (C) SUMMARY. Poland strongly backs the U.S. administration's efforts to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation mechanisms and move forward on arms control negotiations. In particular, Polish MFA officials view the 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference as an opportunity to strengthen unity among NPT participants and to bolster the treaty's effectiveness. Polish officials warn, however, that Middle East issues--particularly differing international strategies for dealing with Iran's nuclear weapons program--could lead to a deadlock in multinational fora. Poland sees itself as a leader in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)--launched in Krakow, Poland in 2003--and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in which it serves on the Executive Council. Our MFA interlocutors would like to increase Poland's level of participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), but face funding and staffing constraints.

END SUMMARY.

POLAND'S POLICY ON KEY ISSUES

12. (C) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): Poland would like to see the CTBT brought into force as quickly as possible. MFA Security Policy officials are encouraged by U.S. efforts to ratify the CTBT but question whether the U.S. administration will be able to win the necessary votes in the Senate.

13. (C) Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT): Poland supports the start of FMCT negotiations with no preconditions. MFA officials emphasized that the agreement should contain a robust verification mechanism.

14. (C) U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts: Polish officials, concerned that Washington might sacrifice the U.S.-Polish strategic relationship on the altar of improved U.S.-Russia relations, closely monitored President Obama's April meeting with Russian President Medvedev and his July visit to Russia. MFA officials told us they are encouraged by the commitment of the U.S. and Russia to engage in earnest negotiations. They believe a successful follow-up to START would set a good precedent for the rest of the world, particularly if strong verification mechanisms were included in the agreement. However, Poles have voiced strong opposition to using the planned U.S. missile defense facilities in Poland as a

bargaining chip in arms control discussions.

¶15. (C) NPT: Poland seeks stronger penalties--such as taking back technology or equipment--for countries that do not comply with NPT provisions or withdraw from the treaty. At the same time, MFA officials tell us that the NPT will have to better address concerns of states that want to develop peaceful uses for nuclear energy. Warsaw seeks to develop nuclear energy as a means to achieve its carbon reduction commitments. Our MFA interlocutors said they were pleasantly surprised by the progress achieved during the May 2009 preparatory committee meeting during which participants quickly adopted the agenda for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Polish officials attributed the meeting's success to the leadership of the conference chair, as well as to the goodwill generated by President Obama's April 5 nonproliferation remarks in Prague.

¶16. (C) Regarding specific countries, MFA officials expressed concern that the Middle East, particularly Iran, might undermine progress on non-proliferation. In Warsaw's view, Tehran has proven to be effective at mobilizing opposition in international fora to U.S. and EU efforts to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program. Polish officials emphasized that Egypt, which has considerable influence in the non-aligned movement, could be key to isolating Iran. In contrast to Iran, China appears to the Poles to be responsive to the current U.S. administration's nonproliferation policy--despite Beijing's close association to the non-aligned movement--and seems committed to the three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and

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peaceful development of nuclear technology.

PROCESS OF POLICY-FORMULATION

¶17. (C) The MFA's Security Policy Department takes the lead in policy formulation on non-proliferation issues. We have not seen evidence of disruptive interagency rivalries on this issue. On the contrary, officials at the interior, finance, defense, and economy ministries speak highly of their MFA colleagues. The MFA has sought to improve coordination of its national response against WMD proliferation by creating an interministerial team devoted to the issue. The team's original mission was to coordinate Poland's efforts related to PSI, but the MFA is seeking to expand its role to address issues such as the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Outside government, the MFA mainly relies on the analysis of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).

¶18. (C) Poland works closely with other EU member states on nonproliferation issues. It participates in monthly meetings that aim to develop common EU positions. Within the NPT framework, MFA officials noted that Poland is an active participant in the NATO-7 group, which also includes Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Turkey. Polish officials emphasized that cooperation with Russia on these issues has been minimal.

TAKING A LEADERSHIP ROLE

¶19. (U) Polish MFA officials and think tank experts highlighted Poland's leadership role in two organizations: the PSI and the OPCW. Poland has been a vital partner in the PSI since former President Bush announced its inception in Krakow in 2003. As an Operational Experts Group participant, Poland has played a leading role in organizing PSI political meetings, regional exercises, and conducting intensive outreach activities. Poland also hosted the Initiative's June 22-24 Operational Experts Group meeting in Sopot.

¶10. (C) Poland serves on the Executive Council of the OPCW and helped draft the Chemical Weapons Convention. It will

take part in training scientists from developing countries in areas such as detection and how to interact with OPCW inspection teams.

¶11. (C) MFA officials told us they would like to increase Poland's profile within GICNT, but they face two major constraints: a shortage of qualified staff and an ever-shrinking travel budget as the government cuts spending in response to the global economic crisis.

STAFFING

¶12. (U) MFA officials note that their ministry is in the middle of its rotation process, but the following people are responsible for nonproliferation issues in Poland's MFA and missions abroad (typically two people staff non-proliferation issues in each mission):

MFA Warsaw:

Lukasz Zielinski-Head of Nonproliferation Section (until January 2010)
Tel: 48-22-523-9370
E-mail: lukasz.zielinski@msz.gov.pl

Monika Lipert-Sowa, First Secretary
Tel: 48-22-523-8919
E-mail: monika.lipert@msz.gov.pl

Szymon Bochenski, Third Secretary
Tel: 48-22-523-9644
E-mail: szymon.bochenski@msz.gov.pl

Geneva:

Marek Zadrozny-Military Advisor
Tel: 41-22-710-9710
E-mail: marek.zadrozny@ties.itu.int

New York:

Tomasz Kaszynski-Military Advisor

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Tel: 1-212-744-2506 ext 141
E-mail: tomasz.kaszynski@msz.gov.pl

Vienna
Przemyslaw Wyganowski-Deputy Head of Mission
Tel: 43-1-87-01-53-03
E-mail: przemyslaw.wyganowski@msz.gov.pl

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